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National Intelligence Council

30 November 1982

NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: EA Agenda for 1983

Senior Intelligence Community managers working on East Asia have a tradition of meeting informally for lunch once a month. At our meeting of 27 October, the SNIO, the DIO, the Director of East Asia of INR and I decided to identify for our principals the key intelligence issues coming up in 1983 in East Asia and support the list of issues with a calendar of major events. We have also prepared a few recommendations for collectors and analysts. If you wish to talk with members of the luncheon group, it can be arranged at your convenience.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM

: David D. Gries

National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

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Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia and Pacific

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SIGINT National Intelligence Officer for Asia

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Director, INR/East Asia and Pacific

SUBJECT

: East Asia Agenda for 1983

- 1. East Asia should remain relatively stable in 1983. Nonetheless, potential leadership changes, Sino-Soviet relations, uneven economic performance, and adverse military trends will test bilateral relations with several countries.
- 2. As a consequence, intelligence collection and analysis will have to address these broad subjects in 1983:
 - -- Leadership changes. Japan's Nakasone is not likely to make significant changes in policy toward the US. The possibility of a return to Labor Party rule in Australia and New Zealand, however, could result in decreasing military cooperation with the US. The leadership of China, Taiwan, North Korea, Vietnam and Burma is in transition with continuity of existing policy uncertain for years beyond 1983.
 - -- Sino-Soviet relations. The dialogue between Chinese and Soviet leaders could lead to improved trade relations and possibly to some reductions in forces along the border, but major differences are likely to persist over Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Chinese support for resistance forces in Kampuchea, and other issues.
 - -- Economic performance. East Asia will continue to grow faster than other Third World areas, though Indochina and the Philippines are notable exceptions. North Korea's foreign debt problems will not be resolved. Japan's trade balances and surplus in current accounts will continue to cause friction. Chinese economic growth will be

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erratic and the US role in it, especially in petroleum, will be significant. Technology transfer will be an issue of increasing importance: US to China; Japan to the USSR, China and North Korea; and Japan to the US and China.

Military trends. Most military trends in East Asia will remain adverse, as growth and modernization in the Soviet Far East, North Korea, and Vietnam continues to outpace military programs in neighboring countries. The North Korean military buildup and twofront war strategy will remain the most dangerous threat in the region. Japanese military capabilities will continue to fall short of US expectations.

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4. A more detailed calendar for East Asia in 1983 is attached.

David D. Gries

